

Music and theat[re] in Germany

As early as 1882 musicians in Berlin founded a Philharmonic Orchestra, and from 1960 to 1963 the unique "Philharmonie" at the Kemperplatz in Berlin was built. 2,200 terraced seats with the podium in the centre. A place for great conductors, for great concerts. It shows that Germany has castles and palaces, cities and industry but also unusual temples of the arts. Other examples are the theatre set on a monumental flight of outdoor stairs in the medieval town of Schwäbisch-Hall; the Baroque garden theatre in Hanover-Herrenhausen; the theatre in the palace of Sch[wetzin]gen near Mannheim, founded 1749, and the Munich Oper[a] Bavarian National Theatre 1811, burnt down later and [re]... its full splendour in 1963. A... grand and elegant music ...





National-Oper, Munich

Philharmonie, Berlin

The German Tribune

...burg, 21 June 1981
...entieth Year - No. 993 - By air

A WEEKLY REVIEW OF THE GERMAN PRESS

C 20725 C
ISSN 0016-8858

Suzuki, standard bearer for the new Japan

...n has come into its own once and ...r all in 1981 as a great power and a ... that cannot be ignored in world ...irs.

...ut friction between Japan and the ...ted States, not to mention its af...math in Tokyo, has shown, however, ...l the process of recognition has yet to ... completed.

Japan has not yet grown accustomed ... being acknowledged as an emanci...ted partner of the United States; nor, ... that matter, has America yet come to ...ms with the idea.

Europeans look on Japan as a far-dis...t country; Japan itself feels very ...ch out on a limb. Geographical dis...ce can give rise to political distance ...d failure to understand, which must ... borne in mind

The Japanese are currently making ...emselves unpopular in the world by ...aching others the old lesson that to ...ay at the top in a civilisation based on ...dvanced technology calls for incontest...d tough international competition.

...o Japan runs the risk of being ...re feared than held in high esteem, ...d that at a time when it would dearly ...e, and not only for economic reasons, ... come closer to the rest of the free ...rld.

So Japanese Premier Zenko Suzuki's ...ks with Bonn Chancellor Helmut ...hmidt must be seen in a context ...der than that of preparing for the ...ly Western economic summit in Ot...tawa.

Both countries' foreign policy leeway ...s hampered by domestic policy conside...rations, the general public failing to ap...preciate international political connota...tions.

In Japan pacificism is still popular in the form in which the response to de...feat in 1945 and the lesson taught the Japanese by the United States.

It is, moreover, reaffirmed in the Ja...panese constitution inasmuch as military conscription and membership of al...liances is constitutionally banned.

Nowadays, however, the Japanese leadership takes a different view, knowing full well that Japan cannot carry on as though there were no such thing as strategic threats.

Soviet SS-20 missiles based near Irkutsk are well within range not only of all South-East Asia but also in a position to cover the whole of Japan.

Yet the Japanese general public do not yet seem to have realised that nuclear weapons are already deployed that could be used by the Soviet Union for purposes of military blackmail.

Japanese policies, on the other hand, must be aimed at peace, which alone can help to ensure that world markets remain open or accessible to its export trade.

The Soviet Union is viewed as a mischief-maker that resorts to military pressure and political subversion to frustrate Japanese interests, in the Persian Gulf even jeopardising 70 per cent of Japan's oil supplies.

Japan has as little interest as does the West in a concerted and provocative encirclement of the Soviet Union but, out there on its own, it is bound to feel the need for gentle but determined containment of the Soviet desire for expansion.

Yet there is a world of difference between this realisation and the making of appropriate decisions by the organs of Japanese democracy.

This gap can only be bridged by a better understanding of the position by the general public.

For the time being the Japanese public, despite being interested in safeguards for the Persian Gulf, are far from approving any idea of participation in an Allied fleet in the Indian Ocean.

This state of affairs naturally comes in for criticism. Japan saves itself the trouble and expense of a professional army of any size, let alone the high technical cost of armaments nowadays.

Criticism is countered by competent Japanese with the argument that Japan is making progress in this context, slowly but surely.

Japan could, if it were to step up its military capacity, control access to surrounding waters and do so by way of mere self-defence.

Yet this would block the exit routes of the entire Soviet fleet in the Far East, which currently totals 1,600,000 tons.

Japan is also manufacturing under licence the F-15 combat aircraft, a run of 100 units, and doing so without much fuss, gaining technological know-how in the process.

By way of comparison, the Tornado jet is causing nothing but political trouble in Germany, whereas Japan is quietly going ahead with building the F-15, which is even more expensive and arguably better.

Thus preparations for suitable Japanese defence precautions are aimed at the more distant future, and the Japanese public are in the dark as to what is at stake.

Japanese leaders are bound to view the increasing inability to act of China with anxiety, while in view of Soviet conventional armament alone trust in the US nuclear shield is steadily becoming *mere lip service*.

Thus there is a growing inclination to confer in confidence with the West while at the same time making it clear that Japan in its current historical position cannot be rated an automatic ally of the West.

Germany, as Japan's second most important partner in the West, must bear in mind these two main factors, Japan's isolated location and its industrial significance.

It must do so in a way that, to be on the safe side, quietly disregards what might be taken to be a matter of course.

Cordiality notwithstanding, Bonn and Tokyo face the tough task of coming to a new understanding the extent of which cannot yet be judged.

Robert Held

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 9 June 1981)



Suzuki and Schmidt in Hamburg . . . wider issue than economics. (Photo: dpa)

IN THIS ISSUE

Counting the nuclear possibilities

Fear is going the rounds in Central Europe: the fear of Germany proving a theatre of nuclear conflict before the end of the decade.

Nuclear hostilities between the superpowers, carried out in Europe, might well prove feasible without running the full risk Russia and America would have to run in the event of a direct, full-scale nuclear showdown.

For decades several thousand US atomic warheads have been stored virtually unnoticed on German soil.

Only now, in the middle of the missile modernisation debate, has a wider public come to appreciate what dreadful weapons have ensured peace and relative security in Europe for the past 30 years.

Yet for not a few people in this country it is not the Soviet SS-20 missiles but the new US Pershing missiles that constitute the threat.

None of the critics of missile modernisation have, however, convincingly explained why, since the mid-70s, the Russians have started to deploy new medium-range missiles within reach of targets in Western Europe.

One such target that is expressly admitted to be a Soviet target is the Federal Republic of Germany.

And no-one has convincingly explained why the Soviet Union should be allowed to use medium-range missile to blackmail Western Europe but the West must dispense with missiles in this category!

Is it a case of Europe being worried to death, so much so that it is prepared to be suicidal in its renunciations?

Missiles are not there to be used but as a deterrent to blackmail of any kind, although this kind of deterrent might be said merely to promote the arms race.

The Soviet Union certainly loses no opportunity of saying it will rearm too if the United States modernises its atomic arsenal in Europe.

That would mean death not by suicide but by a uncontrolled arms race leading, sooner or later, almost automatically to war.

Anxiety is intensified by the fact that neither superpower is behaving in a manner one might wish for as a German.

While continually talking about its desire for detente and disarmament the Soviet Union is deploying one after another the missiles that led to the Nato missile modernisation decision in the

Continued on page 2

■ WORLD AFFAIRS

Ominous rumblings from Moscow hint at Poland's day of reckoning

The Polish Communist Party is suddenly said to be teeming with political chameleons, the country to be overflowing with anti-Soviet terrorists.

The Soviet Union and its allies have deployed all their reserves in the media campaign against Warsaw, and it looks as though the propaganda battle is coming to a head.

The old men in the Kremlin are signalling their conviction that their hold over the East Bloc is more important to them than their reputation, let alone their fame after death.

They seem determined no longer to postpone the toughest decision they are likely to have to make in their political lifetimes should Poland remain intransigent.

The warning letter to the Polish Party sounded similar in content to the final warnings to Mr Dubcek in Czechoslovakia in 1968. In its form it resembled Stalin's 1948 letter to the Yugoslav Communists.

Kania and Jaruzelski, Moscow mainly complained, had not done enough to combat counter-revolution, and as in the case of the Soviet condemnation of Tito the complaint was lodged not with the politbureau, the leadership, but with the 150-member central committee.

The central committee, the Kremlin clearly implied, ought to draw the appropriate conclusions, hand over power to the pro-Soviet minority faction led by Stefan Olszowski and call off the *forthcoming Party conference.*

Weeks ago Moscow's last remaining friends in Poland abandoned all hope of surviving the conference politically. In Prague in 1968 the Party congress was forestalled by the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czecoslovakia.

In Warsaw in 1981 the Kremlin would like to see Mr Olszowski and his men make a last-ditch Polish stand to obviate the need for Soviet tanks to put paid to the reforms.

But Party leader Stanislaw Kania at a hurriedly summoned meeting of the central committee showed determination to lead the death-or-glory squad himself.

He confirmed that the ideological struggle had been neglected and that the Party had been fragmented by opportunicm and Social Democratism.

He announced that there were to be manpower changes in the mass media. He called for a return to discipline, but not for an end to reforms.

He referred to one of the most dramatic moments in Poland's 1,000-year history, yet he failed to cancel the most dangerous deadline of all, the 14 July Party conference.

Parallels with the final days of the Dubcek era in Prague are seemingly overwhelming, but it would still be wrong to go entirely by analogies.

In Prague the Soviet tanks' objective was clearly outlined and easily surrounded. It was the Central Committee building on the banks of the Moldau, from which the Party had entrusted the public with the process of democratisation.

In Warsaw intervention would be an attack on the entire Polish people, on factories transformed into fortresses, because the Poles have taken matters out of the Party's hands.

In Prague overt revisionism was in full flower, whereas in Poland revolution as defined by Lenin is under way:

"For revolution to break out it is not as a rule enough for 'people down below no longer to want to carry on as before.' It is also essential for 'people at the top no longer to be able to do so.' "

Kremlin Leninists have long analysed this state of affairs, which unlike Prague permits no more than a choice between two devastating defeats.

They know well enough what awaits *them if they opt for military intervention*: an army of dead, the assumption of responsibility for billions in foreign debts and the feeding of 25 million Poles who hate their guts.

This is probably what has induced the Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski to tell overhasty pessimists and prophets of gloom that Poland proves that what despotic socialism can stomach depends entirely on the distribution of power.

The miracle that is Poland has certainly gone a long way towards bearing out Kolakowski's claim. Changes over the past year have exceeded all expectations.

The free trade unions have succeeded in covering the length and breadth of the country in their bid for a more balanced distribution of political power.

The Church has gained more extensive rights. The media have achieved a degree of freedom unprecedented in post-war Poland. Parliamentary controls and an independent judiciary are beginning to take shape.

In view of the distribution of power *Moscow was prepared to tolerate much* of this, but from the outset there were two clear limits to the extent of Finlandisation the Soviet Union would be prepared to stomach within its sphere of influence.

There must be no undermining of Poland's membership of the Warsaw Pact and the facade of Communist rule had to be able to withstand the pressure of an extraordinary Party congress.

Moscow has now issued a frank warning and final signal to the effect that neither of these two limits must be exceeded. All have been warned.

With four weeks to go to the first extraordinary congress in the history of the Polish United Workers' Party, the Solidarity trade union organisation was still calling for only 15 per cent of Party officials to be retained.

Nine out of 10 delegates to the congress, all of whom have so far been voted by secret ballot, have been elected for the first time, young technicians in particular.

Few workers have bothered to stand for election, feeling only Solidarity still stands for their interests, not the Party.

In the upper echelons of the Party only two men have survived grass-root hearings and been nominated as delegates to the congress. They are the reformers Barczikowski and Fiszbach.

With a Communist Party democratised to such an extent Poland can no longer possibly remain a reliable ally of the Soviet Union, despite all protestations to the contrary.

So it was clear from the start how much the Soviet system would be able to stomach. Why, then, has there been no stopping the Poles?

The miracle that is Poland has been sustained by the strength and discipline of the masses and by mass demonstrations, but the small cells and circles set up all over the country have been unable to maintain this discipline.

Workers and peasants discovered in nearly every village and nearly every hall that the Danzig accords were initially sabotaged and delayed by the local Party hierarchy.

Increased pressure from below obliged the Party at the grass roots to resort to self-help and put its own house in order.

Two out of three regional Party leaders were sacked, as were 30 Deputy Ministers and 30 state secretaries. ty thousand Party members we pelled too.

Yet the exposure of corruption pread enough to shed a devastating on the entire Soviet system failed the Polish economy back on the

Instead it led to a progressive ration in relations between the public and the powers that be, heig ing anger and flooring discipline labour morale.

Public awareness and debate heightened while production and ies suffered from the worst bottle since the days of Stalin.

Many local unions bathed in the of workers' participation in manage but the share in responsibility th dustrial democracy entails the strictly to the Communists.

If, say, workers needed dismiss ensure a factory operated econom it was a decision assigned to the munists, who were assigned the fall guys.

Solidarity's own ranks were split irreconcilable critics of the govern facing partners ready to compr with the powers that be.

Thus nationalism was the only they held in common, but it faile come up with a political power to out a reform of the system that was any case, virtually impossible.

Polish Catholic publicist Stefan lewski expects there to be a process social crystallisation lasting years similar, he says, to the French Revo tion.

The Kremlin has for the past been content to look on as this pro has gained momentum, but it has so because it is well aware of the de tating consequences of intervention.

Intervention would, for instance paid to Mr Brezhnev's *Westpolitik*, tually paralyse Moscow's foreign po and plunge Eastern Europe into found gloom.

The Soviet leaders would have abandon hope for a very long time Western Europe gradually freeing from America's apron strings.

Nato's missile modernisation pro gramme would be much easier to out and might even be intensified.

US Defence Secretary Caspar Wei berger, who has advised Europe to e bark on welfare cuts to finance an build-up, might well find himself be lent support from a quarter far remo from the White House.

At their last session in Brussels, N Defence Ministers already ruled arms control talks were to be scrapped the Soviet Union were to invade Pola

But is the West really helping Pol with all the means at its command merely underlining the ominous con quences of a decision by Moscow send in the troops?

Are we not duty-bound for our

Continued on page 8

The German Tribune

Publisher: Friedrich Reinecke. Editor-in-Chief: ... Heinz. Editor: Alexander Anthony. English language sub-editor: Simon Burnett. — Distribution Manager: Georgine Picone.

Friedrich Reinecke Verlag GmbH, 23 Schoene Aussicht, Hamburg 76, Tel.: 22 85 1. Telex: 02-14733.

Advertising rates list No. 13 —
Annual subscription DM 35.

Printed by Druck- und Verlagshaus Friedrich Pfeffer, Bremen-Blumenthal. Distributed in the USA by MASS MAILINGS, Inc. 540 West 24th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011.

All articles which THE GERMAN TRIBUNE reprints are published in cooperation with the editorial staffs of leading newspapers of the Federal Republic of Germany. They are complete translations of the original text, in no way abridged nor editorially redrafted.

In all correspondence please quote your subscription number, which appears on the wrapper, between asterisks, above your address.

Nuclear risks

Continued from page 1

first place (and could hardly be expected to do otherwise).

While telling Chancellor Schmidt and Foreign Minister Genscher it would like to negotiate seriously with them, the Soviet Union at home makes out both to be advocates of rearmament and lackeys of the United States.

It is as though the Kremlin were grooming Soviet public opinion for a final break with the policies hitherto pursued towards the West.

The United States too is currently behaving in a most contradictory manner. It remains to be seen whether the Reagan administration seriously means to aim at military superiority, which would entirely change the international situation.

Or is America serious in claiming (and both claims are made quite openly) to be keen to negotiate seriously with the Russians?

When Mr Eagleburger says the United States is not going to be coerced by its allies into disarmament policy decisions it is, irksomely perhaps, only natural for a world power.

So while the debate on policy towards Moscow is in full swing in America we have no way of telling whether Russia is seriously interested in negotiations.

At a time of growing mutual mistrust between the world powers Bonn's role in world affairs can no longer be what it was in the early 70s.

When Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr visit Moscow later this month they will call to mind the need for Bonn's erstwhile *Ostpolitik*, but unlike 10 years ago they are no longer empowered to negotiate on Bonn's behalf and Bonn's own position has changed.

Bonn can, must and does try to convince Moscow that it means missile modernisation seriously and will go ahead with it if the Soviet Union fails to negotiate.

Bonn can, must and does try to convince Washington that it is in America's own interest to hold arms control talks with Moscow and, if possible, end the arms race.

But Bonn can no longer do the negotiating. There is no way in which Bonn policy can induce the Russians to phase out their missiles and make Western missile modernisation superfluous.

Bonn is equally unable to force the United States to negotiate if Washington does not want to do so.

Adrian Zielcke
(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 6 June 1981)

HOME AFFAIRS

New CDU administration takes stock in Berlin

Berlin's new CDU administration faces a tightrope act: it must govern without a majority in the legislature and it must learn to handle the SPD/FDP administrative apparatus.

The latter, built up over the 24 years since the CDU was last in power, is so ...ate that it drove the SPD go...ent to desperation.

The new administration, under Richard von Weizsäcker, faces the ...t of trying to govern under difficult conditions.

...r Berlin problems: it has the militant squatters, the biggest foreign worker problem, the largest group ...al drop-out, the trickiest *Deutschlandpolitik* issues, and it faces a cutback in federal subsidies because Bonn ...n't have enough cash.

Von Weizsäcker is willing to risk the tightrope act. He has made it clear since his election victory last month that he ...nds to exercise the mandate of the Senate despite the fact that his party is a couple of votes short of a majority in the legislature and SPD and FDP have made it clear that they are determined to man the opposition benches rather than enter into a coalition with the CDU.

He is prepared to put up with conditions as they are and see his CDU ...ate through the full four-year legislative period *with*out any coalition flirta...

He has not even kept a senatorial post ...r for a possible coalition with the ...P.

Governing with a minority presupposes a policy that is prepared to forgo ...p politics and seek a basic consensus at least with the five FDP legislators who are prepared to cooperate with a CDU Senate.

And if possible this consensus should include the SPD, which has promised it would not be obstructionist.

There are those who say that it cannot be done in the long run. But von Weizsäcker differs. He even considers going with a minority as an opportunity for orienting policy purely by the issues at hand rather than making political concessions.

Even so, he will have to be prepared to compromise at the expense of party ideology.

Such a difficult course presupposes a top-notch government team; and von Weizsäcker seems to have managed to ... such a team around him.

All his senators (except one) are experts in their fields, chosen without pure political concessions. So there are no compromise choices.

The new mayor himself calls it a "for...te blend" that seven of the 12 senators are Berliners (he counts himself as a Berliner).

Von Weizsäcker made a point of taking a long, close look at the work of Berliners over the past few years before nominating them.

Former floor leader Heinrich Lummer, who, as president of the legislature, developed a conciliatory way of dealing with dissenters, is the new deputy mayor and senator of the interior.

The new labour senator, Wronski, an engineer by profession, is an experienced legislator but was never a full-time party policitian.

The new construction and housing senator, Rastemborski, a lawyer, proved his abilities as chairman of the investigation committee for the Garski affair.

Finance Senator Kunz made a name for himself as a Berlin Bundestag MP and parliamentary administrator of the CDU/CSU Bundestag caucus.

The two other Berliners are Professor Scholz, a legal expert who was called back from Munich, and Hassemer, a department head at the Federal Environment Authority.

Those who came from West Germany are also impressive, among them Norbert Blüm, Rhineland-Palatinate Education Minister Hanna-Renate Laurien, Elmar Pieroth, a prominent Bonn MP, and Ulf Fink, who became "available" following certain disputes in Bonn.

There is also another way of looking at von Weizsäcker's team. He has brought two prominent legal minds to the Senate (Kewening from Kiel and Scholz from Munich) plus Laurien and the Bonn MPs Blüm, Kunz and Pieroth.

The cabinet thus ranges from conservatives like Lummer and Laurien all the way to liberals and the non-partisan Professor Scholz.

It is thus a well-balanced cabinet chosen because of expertise.

It was anything but easy to rally such a team — especially considering that some of the CDU politicians in Bonn stood a good chance of rising in their careers while Berlin's minority Senate still has to prove itself in practical day-to-day politics. Von Weizsäcker is said to have had his problems in fielding such a team. But there has been one sore point from the very beginning that has marred the generally good image of the new Senate: Blüm, the chairman of the CDU Social Affairs Committees in Bonn and most prominent of the newcomers. Instead of accepting the nomination as labour senator, as was generally expected and a post for which he is eminently qualified, Blüm prevailed with his wish to be given the post of federal affairs senator and be sent to Bonn where he can continue pursuing his federal business.



The new mayor, Richard von Weizsäcker (left) and his defeated predecessor, Hans-Jochen Vogel. (Photo: dpa)

This makes Blüm the only wrong choice.

While he is an expert on social affairs, he is unfamiliar with the intricate legal questions that go with Berlin's special status.

Moreover, the Berlin electorate which might have voted for the CDU due to the attraction of Blüm's name must now consider itself cheated.

It seems obvious that the credit von Weizsäcker was given for picking his team only according to personal ability has suffered as a result of this concession.

Von Weizsäcker who, in governing the city will depend on the votes of five FDP members of the legislature, will find his task an uphill struggle in which he will constantly be forced to find viable compromises.

But this very fact could well help him in achieving his aim of restoring some consensus in the city, stopping the growing violence and making the Berliners find new roots in their city.

The FDP and SPD, who can no longer form a government and probably do not wish to following their election defeat, are unlikely to be in a great hurry to put a spanner in the works.

They need time to regroup in the opposition; and that is exactly the time von Weizsäcker has to prove that he can govern convincingly. *Renate Marbach*
(Kieler Nachrichten, 9 June 1981)

SPD chooses mayor for Hamburg

Klaus von Dohnanyi has been chosen as Hamburg's new mayor in succession to Hans-Ulrich Klose.

Von Dohnanyi is state minister at the Foreign Office and chairman of the Rhineland-Palatinate SPD.

The choice has been welcomed by the party hierarchy, and particularly by the SPD chairman, Willy Brandt.

But it has still to be confirmed by the party.

Von Dohnanyi was chosen by Hans Apel, the Defence Minister, who was, as a Hamburg MP in Bonn, empowered by the party to make a nomination for the position.

Herr Klose resigned over an issue involving nuclear power policy.

There is every likelihood that the Rhineland-Palatinate SPD will also approve of von Dohnanyi's move to Hamburg, his home city.


Von Dohnanyi has probably figured prominently in Brandt's speculations about a successor to Klose ever since his resignation.

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt would probably have preferred to see Anke Fuchs, state secretary at the Bonn Labour Ministry in Hamburg's *Rathaus*.

But Frau Fuchs, who is the daughter of ex-Hamburg Mayor Nevermann, refused to step into her father's shoes.

The SPD was surprisingly quick in presenting an alternative to Klose (as it was after the resignation of Berlin's Mayor Dietrich Stobbe whom it replaced by Hans-Jochen Vogel).

Von Dohnanyi is also an acceptable proposition for the electorate who will be called upon next year to decide whether this country's biggest city excluding Berlin should continue to be governed by a Social Democratic Senate.



Klaus von Dohnanyi
(Photo: Marianne von der Lancken)

The CDU has long had its sights on the Lower Saxony Finance Minister Walther Leisler Kiep as its top candidate.

Leisler Kiep himself seems to be quite prepared to follow his party's summons when it comes, which should be soon.

By nominating Dohnanyi, the SPD has not only regained some of the ground it lost but has also put the ball in the opposition's court.

Von Dohnanyi, every bit as urbane as Leisler Kiep, would have a year in which to prove himself as a mayor and gain the necessary support by the left and right wingers in his party to be put at the top of the ticket for the next election.

He is not the sort of man to kindle emotions — something that is of paramount importance to the Hamburg SPD. He is as uninvolved in the SPD's internal dispute over the Brokdorf nuclear power station as he is in the dispute over the Nato arms decision.

Bonn has long appreciated his friendly manner that enables him to let hotly disputed issues rest for the time being.


If he applies this talent to Hamburg politics he could well succeed in adopting the Klose line on the Brokdorf issue while at the same time delaying the implementation of the party decision until after the election — and then take it from there.

Von Dohnanyi himself would probably have preferred to have remained the Rhineland-Palatinate party chairman where he has been successful enought to almost wrest away Bernhard Vogel's absolute majority in the election two years ago.

But now that Hans-Dietrich Genscher has already agreed that the Rhineland-Palatinate FDP should not commit itself to a coalition before the next state election (when the FDP could well join ranks with the CDU) Dohnanyi no longer stands a chance of becoming that state's prime minister.

It was ultimately Genscher who enabled von Dohnanyi to defend the Hamburg *Rathaus* against Leisler Kiep.

So the duel between the two can begin. But the final word rests with the electorate. *Hans Wolff*
(Nordwest Zeitung, 11 June 1981)



POLITICS

Schmidt, Genscher, gain credit for not yielding on Nato issue

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher deserve credit for having linked their political destinies with the Nato decision to boost its European defence potential.

It would have been a lot easier for both to have yielded to the strong and influential minorities in their parties (in the case of Baden-Württemberg SPD *this "minority" is in fact a strong majority*) and distanced themselves from the Nato decision.

Genscher, who has no Willy Brandt to fall back on, might be able to live with his party congress stance. But whether Schmidt's threat to resign over the issue has achived more than to provide him with a breathing space remains to be seen.

For the SPD, the issue of the 572 pieces of rocketry to be stationed in Europe in two or three years is only superficially the bone of contention. The party suffers from a malady that goes much deeper: it is faced with an identity crisis of its own making.

There are a number of reasons for this: one of the most important is the fact that, by the criteria of SPD objectives, the achievements of the coalition government are meagre. This is to some extent due to concessions that had to be made to the coalition partner.

The party is also suffering because of the nation's 1.2 million unemployed, its total inability to implement reforms, the steel crisis and, of course, the empty state coffers that force it to impose ever new burdens on the man-in-the-street.

What troubles the minority with its great influence even more is the whole complex of détente and peace policy.

These left wingers blame the Chancellor personally for the dramatic deterioration in East-West relations over the past few years.

Détente is a moral obligation for the SPD. But even so, the party has never hesitated to make use of political expedients. This policy has been successful *with the electorate.*

But things have changed. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan and Poland is threatened by the their "fraternal assistance".

There can be no denying that Moscow has used the decade of détente for an unprecedented arms buildup. The last four years have been marked by the buildup of an enormous arsenal targeted on Europe.

It is not some incorrigible conservative who wants to draw his defence conclusions from this fact but the Social Democratic Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

But large elements of his party oppose him. Everybody in the SPD whose avowed creed is détente now rebels against the Nato decision and has ideologically joined forces with the renascent pacifism in the churches, youth organisations and environmentalist movements.

Anticapatalist emotions, seemingly successfully repressed since Godesberg, in 1959 when the party abandoned extreme socialism, have come to the fore again and zeroed in on the new American administration with which the left wingers want to have as little brush as possible.

The fact that Schmidt differs has alienated him from his party.

Added to the list of problems is the energy crisis which, in the Chancellor's view, necessitates the construction of nuclear power plants.

Here, again, Schmidt differs from most of his party, which would like to see less growth and more energy thrift *by the public.*

Erhard Eppler's success at the Baden-Württemberg party congress in Aalen was not only due to his being against the Nato decision (his motion was carried with a spectacular 80 to 20 ma... but also to the fact that for la... tions of the party he embodies the... logical opposite of Schmidt in ... all fields, ranging from nuclear ... via the environment all the way ... being viewed as an apostle of peace.

But there are two more SPD ... cians who have been put on a p... by the left wingers: Matthöfer ... Hans-Ulrich Klose.

Whenever one of these two ... into introspection, Willy Brandt ... point of expressing his under... and respect.

Angered by an unrelated issue, ... cently said of Germany's policy ... policy? — that it was "backw... lacks political and economic ... gence."

It has indeed become a matter ... culation how long the SPD will ... its Chancellor. The opposing mi... gradually developing into a majo...

Influential party members ... signed communist-inspired disar... appeals, despite warnings from ... headquarters (though they were ... warm at best); they took part in ... strations to that effect or made ... like Rev. Albertz recently.

Fraternisation with the com... which once led to the expulsion ... chairman Benneter now go virtu... noticed and unopposed.

There is a clear swing to the l... the SPD increasingly turns into a ... cal seeker of the "blue flower" (a... ence to the romantic poet Novalis).

The Social Democrats want to ... cate themselves from the respons... and burdens of government.

Should the Bonn government ... toppled over the Nato decision, ... Eppler's successor said in Aalen.

Taken with a pinch of salt, it c... said that large sections of the ... might even be relieved *by such a* ... tingency.

Fritz Ullrich...

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, ...)

Worth of the Bundesrat

The Bundesrat as an instrument of our federal system has proved its worth, President Karl Carstens told the Upper House in an address marking its 500th session.

Now, 32 years after the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany, he said, we can note with satisfaction that the Bundesrat has been an element of stability, that it has been instrumental in many cultural developments and that it has developed into a "source of intellectual wealth."

The ceremony in Bad Godesberg was also attended by Bundestag President Richard Stücklen, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Bundesrat President Werner Zeyer *(Saarland).*

In view of the undeniable disadvantages of the federal system — President Carstens cited our educational problems as one example — he called for closer cooperation between the *Länder.*

This country, he said, was celebrating the continuity of its democratic institutions.

Kiel Constitution expert Professor Karl Dietrich Erdmann in his speech referred to the Bundesrat as a "singular phenomenon".

The Bundesrat as we know it, he said, could never have emerged from a drawing board. "As a result of the *Länder* and conveyed through them, it represents old German constitutional tradition adapted to our day."

Now, none of the *Länder*, Erdmann said, has a hegemonial supremacy over the other federal states and Bonn has no say in the affairs of the Bundesrat.

"The *Länder* now have a more effective instrument in shaping federal affairs than they had in the Bundesrat of the Kaiser era."

Should the foundation of society be shattered and should the political mentality tend towards opposing the parliamentary rules of the game, and should the categoric imperative of a state-oriented willingness to compromise no longer apply, such a "republic without republicans would be lost notwithstanding the best of legal and federal safety measures," he said.

"The implacable educational conflicts have thus also been caused by Bonn's tactless interference in a domain that falls solely under the jurisdiction of the *Länder.* As a result, we should review the socalled common tasks."

The Bundesrat is the first realisation of a federal system of effective codetermination.

ddp

(Die Welt, 5 June 1981)

Pressure on SPD in the cities

The Social Democrats are in the throes of a major crisis in Germany's cities.

Frankfurt, Munich, Berlin and now Hamburg. The question now is: which city will be next? Bremen? Or perhaps one of the Ruhr cities?

The SPD keeps staring apprehensively at its bastions which the CDU and CSU once considered impregnable and which have now dropped into their laps like overripe fruit.

The storm the SPD has to weather following the surprise resignation of Hamburg Mayor Hans-Ulrich Klose is only one of a long sequence of difficulties. The end is not yet in sight.

Hamburg is symptomatic of the crisis roots: the internal conflict between ideology and day-to-day politics which is becoming increasingly irreconcilable.

This can either take the form of the ideological doggedness with which Herr Klose pursued his anti-nuke policy, fighting all those who pinned their hopes on economic growth and affluence; or it can take the form of the Munich debacle where such ideological controversies were battled out without regard for day-to-day politics until City Hall was softened up for the final assault by the CSU.

The SPD in the major cities in conurbation areas is evidently no longer capable of overcoming its home-made ideological hurdles and dealing instead with such down-to-earth issues as housing, energy, the integration of foreign workers and their families, environmental protection or education.

It was this business of the day in the municipality for the good of the people that once represented the SPD's strong points.

And since this party was so successful in this field it managed to capture one city after another during the Weimar and Adenauer eras.

And for years Bonn's SPD headquarters drew on the municipalities for new blood — men who had proved themselves in the field, such as Willy Brandt, who was Mayor of Berlin and later became chancellor.

Today, things are the other way around. The SPD's municipal strength is waning fast.

It all began four years ago with Frankfurt; and anybody who in the early 1970s predicted that the CDU would soon hold the absolute majority in that city would have been ridiculed.

In the Hesse municipal elections the CDU made further gains against the SPD. And by now CDU Mayor of Frankfurt Walter Wallmann is generally considered one of the most able of Germany's mayors.

Frankfurt was foolowed by Munich where SPD Mayors Vogel and Kronawitter were treated as enemies by their ... party until the city finally fell into ... lap of the CSU.

Berlin, with the pitiful resignation ... its SPD Mayor Dietrich Stobbe and ... election defeat of his successor, ... marked the lowest point so far of ... Social Democratic crisis in the cities.

Now it's Hamburg, where the ... wisely rejects the CDU and ... demand for new elections in the ... of Klose's resignation. The ... Democrats fear that the electorate ... send it into the opposition.

The municipal crisis is coupled w... personnel crisis in the SPD. Inste... new blood for Bonn coming from ... municipalities, the anaemic capital ... to staff city halls.

Karl Ravens, formerly state mini... the Chancellery, was sent to Ha... this was followed by Koschnik, ... mayor of Bremen, whom the SPD ... quarters sent off saying that his c... eded a "real man".

Then came Bonn Justice M... Vogel, the Chancellors's crown p... who was dispatched to Berlin. ... Defence Minister Hans Apel or ... Fuchs could well have to take o... Hamburg. It's an endless bloodletting.

The SPD finds itself in a dan... pincer; the erosion in the municip... is now followed by a personnel ...

The question is: how long will the ... be able to weather this development?

Bernd R...

(Saarbrücker Zeitung, 5 June ...)

THE THIRD WORLD

Brandt hits out at guns-over-butter attitude that hurts poor nations

There are more explosives than food in the world; and the arms race is ... fastest-growing business by far, says ... Brandt, the chairman of the ...-South Commission.

... comparison, development aid by ... industrial countries is meagre, he ...

...ndt's comments express the pent ...ger of a man who finds himself up ... alley in his effort to solve the ...tional task he has been charged ...

...e world's industrial nations are in...ngly entrenching themselves be... their own financial woes, and de...pment aid money flows primarily to ... countries that have become ...inent as Third World speakers at ...national conferences. Meanwhile, ...ld famine continues to grow.

...nless something happens soon, ...ndt is cited as having said, "We shall go to hell."

The affluence gap between North and ...th is growing ever wider and Third ...rld prospects of making any headway ...ll are becoming slimmer the more ...rgy prices rise.

The fact that there seems to be abso...ly no effective way of controlling the ...pulation explosion does not help eith...

So far affluence has proved the best ...ans of birth control and exactly this ... lacking in the Third World.

A bleak picture indeed. There is no ...er available to the question as to ... is at fault and what can be done to ...edy the situation.

Does the blame always rest with the ...aiters? Or does it rest with those ... engage in an arms race? Or is it in ... always "the others" who bear the ...e? Or should some of it go to the ...eloping countries themselves?

A look at the globe makes it clear ... things are not all that simple. For ... thing, there is not a single industrial ...ntry that has ever been a colony ...re the conquerors devastated not ... the country but the indigenous cul... and religion as well.

On the other hand, virtually all deve...ping countries are former colonies.

The hasty conclusion is that all the ...ry is ultimately due to the white ... But did the white man destroy the spiritual and religious bases of future affluent societies of a different type?

Or did he perhaps come upon cultural bases that precluded such a society in the first place? There is much to indicate that this is so.

There is yet another question: what is affluence? There can be little doubt that many a paradise has been destroyed by the white man by his grafting his own culture upon other countries without enabling them to truly understand an absorb it.

And since Western civilisation came in the wake of Western culture today's developing countries were forced to become used to it.

The result was an enormous population explosion triggered by medical and technical progress and by Catholicism. The result was also the political aim to establish a Western-type civilisation of affluence.

It is in the wake of all this intellectual, religious and material destruction perpetrated by the conquerors that the responsibility of the developing countries themselves begins.

The question is: can they be sure that Western civilisation can be copied, that they can master and achieve it and, ultimately, that this is desirable?

And should they consider all this desirable, are their countries in a position to develop an educational system capable of coping with this civilisation in all its ramifications?

Must they have the same high rise buildings and the same islands of human habitation as the Western world?

Neither the North nor the South has ever engaged in a meaningful discussion on a development concept half way between northern civilisation and a southern world which has to live with other climatic conditions and other traditions.

We have always advocated "help towards self help". But the self help we have in mind has to be achieved with Western methods. The only exception here is the development aid provided by the churches.

It should surprise no one that all the mammoth sums of money that have been spent have never gone where they are really needed.

All this money usually goes to the more or less artificial cities of the developing countries — cities they fallaciously consider replicas of Western civilisation.

It is frequently these cities that are seen as supporting their inhabitants' claim to Western civilisation. They have, in fact, prevented a new North-South synthesis that would have been in keeping with the basic needs of the people.

The mere realisation that something has to be done about North-South relations is not in itself tantamount to a bridge spanning different cultures.

There has always been enough money for developing countries when this money promoted political aims and even more so when it served strategic objectives.

But prosperity occurred only under the wings of a monopoly as in the case of the Arab Opec countries.

Virtually no developing country has any genuine understanding of the West. As a result, it will be difficult to reach agreement and to come to terms with the differences that mark the two worlds.

As long as everybody wants everything it is unlikely that genuine development will occur, and all development aid other than that which prevents outright misery is misapplied.

Bernd Hansen

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, 7 June 1981)

Call for stiffer political will to help

The President of the United Nations General Assembly, Rüdiger von Wechmar, has called on leading politicians to express a commitment to success before the unofficial North-South summit in Mexico City.

The meeting, involving 20 heads of state, is to be held in October.

His call is an apt comment on the blind alley in which the North-South dialogue finds itself.

The UN has for years served as a venue for global conferences on such items as food, the population explosion, the environment, a New International Economic Order, transfer of technology and monetary problems.

There has been no shortage of intelligent analyses of the looming disaster, nor has there been a shortage of reasonable proposals for a solution.

But there has been a shortage of the political desire to come out of ideological and material trenches.

Bureaucrats of all nations return from their conference tours without having achieved any results whatsoever in combating the world's famine, disease and poverty.

Yet they proudly report to their political leaders at home: we've achieved nothing; but neither has the other side.

It is this hopelessly bogged down situation that three years ago prompted World Bank President McNamara to appoint an independent commission on development issues staffed by prominent personalities of all continents and chaired by Willy Brandt.

But the North-south Commission's proposals were immediately rejected by those conservatives of each of the two blocs who did not consider them appropriate.

The fact that the members of the Brandt Commission, during a Berlin preparatory meeting for the Mexico summit, clashed with Helmut Schmidt is not surprising.

On the contrary. It is perfectly normal and typical of the world-wide situation that a Social Democratic German chancellor should adopt a position to the right of many politicians committed to solving the North-South problem.

The conflict between Schmidt and the members of the Commission is probably only a mild foretaste of the controversies and differing standpoints that will have to be discussed in Mexico City once the public part of the meeting is over and the politicians are forced to put their cards on the table.

The North-South conflict does not originate in the fact that one politician has more and another less understanding for the problems of another country. Instead, every head of state or government is under massive pressure from those who refuse to yield material possessions or those who have nothing to lose.

It is not as if the conservative guardians of the North's material achievements wanted to perpetuate poverty, sickness, famine and misery in the South

The fact is that the gigantic and still growing economic woes of the developing countries can no longer be remedied through conventional development aid — crumbs from the table of the haves.

Even less can they be remedied if the haves, beset by economic problems of their own, consider themselves impoverished and thus become thrifty even with their crumbs.

Moreover, even if the money spent for development aid were to be doubled, no Third World development could ensue by pumping this money into old and unsound Third World economic structures as long as the developing countries do not change their policies.

The distribution struggle between the nations and regions of the world is growing fiercer all the time; and the weapons used in this struggle for survival on the one hand and for the preservation of affluence on the other are becoming increasingly brutal.

Apportioning blame alone won't get us any further. All it will do is increase the danger of any small fire in the North-South conflict becoming the spark that will ignite the latent Eat-West conflict and lead to a global conflagration.

Gone are the days when arms and development policy, domestic economic policy, world trade policy and East-West and North-South issues could be tidily separated and pigeonholed.

What is needed now is a rethinking process by all — not only the politicians but society as a whole as well.

The preparations for the North-South summit in Mexico City (which will be attended by the USA but not the Soviet Union) could mark a beginning that could then be followed by a dialogue of the superpowers and, ultimately, by a global UN conference. *Hannes Burger*

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2 June 1981)

Rumblings from Moscow

Continued from page 2

...re's sake to apply pressure on other ...rs when such a dramatic decline in ... fortunes of the Soviet post-war em...e seems imminent?

At the 26th congress of the Soviet ...mmunist Party Mr Brezhnev was all ... favour of a summit meeting with Pre...ent Reagan as soon as possible.

The new US President does not want ... pace and subject matter of his poli... to be dictated by the Kremlin, and in ...mal circumstances this would be a ...mal reaction.

But times are anything but normal, ... attending a summit meeting would ..., by any stretch of the imagination, make President Reagan a Neville Chamberlain.

At the last minute he might lend crucial support to Kremlin leaders who despite their mistaken decisions and shortcomings still advocate *Westpolitik.*

Mr Reagan's crusade so far has given them scant hope of Soviet restraint paying dividends. For an entire year the West has threatened sanctions but failed to work out concepts for use in the event of a decision by the Soviet Union to renounce the use of force.

Could it make good this failure at the last minute or has the point of no return already been passed?

Christian Schmidt-Häuer

(Die Zeit, 12 June 1981)

■ FINANCE

EEC survey analyses huge Japanese lead in world motor industry

Japan's auto industry is so far advanced that its competitors face an almost impossible task to catch up, according to an EEC survey.

The industry in Japan has not yet finished growing. Its enormous productivity and investment growth are only just beginning to pay off, says the analysis, produced by the EEC Commission in Brussels.

If Japan were prevented from exporting, it would set up assembly plants in target countries. A foundation had already been laid.


Japan had made most progress towards developing a world car.

"Many explanations for the success of Japan's auto industry have been put forward, among them productivity, the social structure, the wage level and a frequently cheap yen", says the survey.

"But their competitiveness cannot be reduced to such individual factors. Instead, it is the result of a long term strategy."

What mattered for Japan's auto makers was not so much immediate profits but the development of their positions on world markets.

Financing was no problem because the state acted as a backer.



Major industrial corporations, banks and the state all pulled in the same direction. Industry enjoyed the kind of tax relief German companies could only dream of.

Thus, for instance, the Japanese could write off 68 per cent of the purchase price of new machinery in the first year. And high technology investments enable the investor to deduct instantly up to 20 per cent of the purchase price from his current income tax provided this did not exceed 10 per cent of the tax due.

As a result, Japan's industry invested at a rate unheard of in Europe or America.

The three largest auto makers (Toyota, Nissan and Mitsubishi) showed an investment-output ratio between 1974 and 1977 of 35 per cent on average, compared with 18 per cent for Europe's ten largest auto makers and 14 per cent for America.

The Brussels Commission says that half of the world's industrial robots are in Japan, though France's state-owned Renault concern denies this. It says Japan and Europe have about the same number.

While the EEC's auto production virtually stagnated throughout the 1970s and exports dropped, the Japanese increased their output by 122 per cent and exports by as much as 426 per cent.

According to an analysis by the French Senate, Japan's productivity over the past 20 years has risen at twice the European rate and at four times America's.

This was not only due to favourable investment conditions but also to Japan's purpose-oriented strategy.

Two examples: Japan's automobile makers had invested a great deal in training their labour force, which was firmly tied to the respective companies.

Two-thirds of Japan's skilled workers had completed high school.

Even subcontractors' productivity was twice that of the EEC. This was particularly significant in view of the fact that subcontractors accounted for between 65 and 80 per cent of the total production compared with 50 to 55 per cent in the EEC.

As part of their export drive, the Japanese had succeeded in achieving maximum transport efficiency for the shipment of their goods to distant markets.

They had a perfect communications setup in which orders are transmitted by satellite and a centrally controlled fleet with freight rates amounting to only 40 per cent of Europe's rates, say the Brussels analysts.

This answers the question as to how the Japanese could offer their goods as cheaply as they did despite the long transport routes to foreign markets. Japan's mammoth Mitsubishi Corporation, for instance, had its own fleet of ships.

Japanese workers were simply more industrious than their European and American counterparts. And they striked less.

Japanese assembly lines operated for 2,000 hours a year on average compared with 1,717 hours in France and 1,626 in Germany.

Japan's production costs were 20 to 30 per cent lower than in Europe.

But in all likelihood they were even lower and there was nothing to indicate that Europe could ever catch up.

Japan's major manufacturers planned to invest $ 12bn in the next three years — mostly for the development of mini cars of about 500cc.

There was much to indicate that the bulk of these cars would not have to be shipped from Japan but would be assembled in Europe or in Third World countries closer to the markets.

When this happened, Japan's production costs will take a further dive.

Winfried Münster

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 1 June 1981)

Limited benefit to trade with East Bloc

It is unlikely that increased trade with the East Bloc would reduce joblessness, as has been suggested.

The production of goods for East Bloc countries requires highly skilled labour while most of our unemployed are unskilled.

West Germany's trade with the East Bloc now accounts for no more than 6 to 7 per cent of our total foreign trade — too little to have a noticeable effect on the labour market.

We should guard against overestimating our rising sales to the East Bloc. The growth rates here are largely due to price increases and therefore do not reflect the true position.

For example: Soviet shipments to this country in 1979 and 1980 (primarily oil, gas and uranium) were 18 per cent more expensive than in the previous two years.

For Moscow, this meant additional earnings of close to DM3bn. At the same time, German exports to the Soviet Union (mostly machinery and metal goods) increased in price by only 5 per cent. The Federal Republic of Germany was thus the clear loser on prices.

Even though we still have a surplus in our trade with the East Bloc, the boom years are gone.

Some pundits say that our trade with the East Bloc in real terms now stands at the level of 1971.

What we lack are orders for major projects that would have a positive effect on employment.

Should the East-West talks get off the ground again, as hoped for by Nato and the EEC, trade relations could also improve.

But it is still wide open when this will happen and what the outcome will be.

(General-Anzeiger, 3 June 1981)

Interest rates 'set to remain high'

Heavy intervention on foreign exchange markets is not the answer to the bullish dollar.

Bundesbank President Karl Otto Pöhl and his American opposite number, Paul Volcker, agreed on this at the four-day International Monetary Conference in Lausanne.

Representatives of 115 major banks of 22 Western countries plus a number of central bank representatives, attended.

But this was pretty much as far as the consensus went. Herr Pöhl told Mr Volcker that he was not quite "happy" with the priorities of Washington's economic policy.

Volcker stressed that the American Federal Reserve Bank's scope for action was limited.

The president of the Swiss Central Bank, Fritz Leutwiler, wanted it clearly understood that the "brakes on the money supply could not be applied any further."

The interest rate levels of the major industrial countries will remain high throughout this year due to the central banks' efforts to curb inflation.

This was the generally held view of the presidents of the major commercial banks.

A highly regarded bank representative — backed by a number of central bank delegates — told the conference that the differences in interest rates on international money markets would continue to prevent a genuine equilibrium until the major industrial countries, and the United States in particular, found the right blend of fiscal and monetary measures in their fight against inflation.

The interest rates and their differences from country to country wer[e] major topics.

But there was also no overlooking [the] fact that the drepressed mood tha[t] prevailed at last year's conferen[ce in] New Orleans has given way to ca[utious] optimism.

At that time the delegates wer[e pri]marily concerned with the banks' [ability] to resume their function in recycli[ng pe]trodollars after the second majo[r oil] shock.

The president of the Belgian Ba[nkers'] Association, Jean Godeaux, said tha[t the] risk factor for banks had increas[ed in] the past few years.

The enormous interest rate flu[ctua]tions, he said, had developed into o[ne of] the main problems. The ratio be[tween] short and long-term interest rate[s and] the constant upward trend for [long-]term money could be seen as a p[...] ed consequence of the monetary p[olicy] of the past few years.

dpa/VWD

(Die Welt, 9 Jun[e 1981])

Germany 'still' has good credit rating'

The Federal Republic of Ge[rmany] has lost some of its competitive[ness] on international markets, but it i[s] basically creditworthy.

Germany's mismanaged sp[ending] policy, which has been sharply cri[ticised] by Bundesbank President Karl Ot[to Pöhl,] has made this country a p[...] borrower of some interest.

But Germany's credit-worthiness depends on the extent to whi[ch] doubts about ourselves become [...] abroad.

After all, who is in a better p[osition] to evaluate the strengths and [weak]nesses of the economy if not the [coun]try's own analysts?

This self-doubt leads to higher [inter]est rates charged by the lenders th[...] to serve their best customers first.

And exactly this could happ[en ...] Bonn Finance Minister Matthöfer [...] the Frankfurt-based Bank für [Wiederaufbau ...] struction when they make anothe[r ...] for Saudi Arabian money — the [...] to plug the DM10bn hole in [the] 1981 budget and the latter to mi[...] DM6.3bn needed for the planned [sub]sidies for medium sized business.

Reports on the linkage of S[audi] Arabian and other loans with Ge[rman] arms shipments have been denie[d ...] the arguments used in the denia[ls ...] cate that Bonn is virtually at R[iyadh's] mercy.

The fact that the Saudi Arabia[ns and] the Gulf Emirates do not view the [re]lations as a one-sided assistance [...] Germany (as has been reaffirmed by [the] departing Saudi Arabian ambassa[dor in] Bonn) is not new. It is also unde[rstand]able.

The fact that Bonn's attitude is n[ot] quite in keeping with the expectati[ons] in these Arab states is another story. [But] it will certainly not make the ne[gotia]tions easier.

Be all this as it may. The doubts [about] Germany's credit-worthiness that [are] rampant at home must not be al[lowed] to spread abroad because this would [have] repercussions for the economy [as a] whole.

If this were the case we woul[d] have to foot the bill in the for[m of] higher interest rates.

Marcel C[...]

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und [Welt,] 5 June 1[981])

■ [A]VIATION

An unselfconscious ugly duckling takes to air

[Alon]gside the latest jets at the Paris [ai]r show, the Dornier Do 228 look[s lik]e an old grey mare among pranc[ing th]oroughbreds.

[It ca]nnot be described as elegant: it [has a] foursquare basic shape and a ta[...]il unit to make it look a little [...]r.

[T]he Do 228 is an example of [...] German technology, the third [...] following two flops, to launch [an excl]usively German civil aviation pro[ject.]

[It i]s a 14 to 19 seater (aircraft with 20 [o]r more are required to use an air [hostess]) turboprop.

[At th]e moment, Dornier envisage sell[ing ab]out 300 units, which should take [the pr]oject past the break-even point. [Tota]l potential for this type of aircraft [over] the next 10 years is estimated at [...]3,500.

[Mos]t of the sales are expected to be in [the T]hird World.

[Th]e new machine has a duckbill [nose] and an exterior studded with [rivets] that look for all the world like a [rash] of pimples.

[The] undercarriage looks more like the [whee]ls of a private car in the family sa[loon] category, tucking away in flight [in a] container fixed to the fuselage.

[In] its hangar at the Dornier works air[field] near Munich the Do 228 does not [prete]nd to have the elegance and pedi[gree] of a modern jet aircraft: it is po[wered b]y twin propeller engines.

[It ta]kes an expert to point out the [fine] points and special features of the [plane, s]uch as its mirror-smooth wings [and b]evelled wing-tips.

[Ther]e, for instance, its new, four-blade [propel]lers and the new materials be[neath] the paint: carbon and glass fibre [that s]ound just a little duller than metal [when] you knock on them.

[The]se are all features that bear out [the de]signers' claim that the Do 228 is [an air]craft comprising the very latest in [techno]logy.

[Whe]n Claudius Dornier jr, eldest son [of th]e firm's founder, announced last [year a]t the Hanover air fair that the Do [228 w]ould be flying at this year's Paris [air sh]ow, the reaction was sceptical.

[Las]t year a scale model was all there [was t]o show for the project, and fore[casts] of this kind had often proved un[duly o]ptimistic in the past.

[A ye]ar ago there were still three Ger[man a]ero manufacturers (Messerschmitt-[Bölkow]-Blohm and VFW have since [decide]d to amalgamate).

[It s]eemed odd that Dornier, the third [and s]mallest, should make the third bid [to la]unch an exclusively German project, [especi]ally in view of the previous flops.

[Ha]mburger Flugzeugbau, owned by [the] Blohm family, had come a cropper [with] the executive Hansa Jet and been [left w]ith no option but to merge with [Messer]schmitt and Bölkow of Munich.

[VF]W-Fokker in Bremen fared no bet[ter w]ith the VFW 614, a 40-seater jet [that p]roved a fiasco. It didn't sell, No. [...m]arked the end of the road and the [comp]any was left in dire financial stra[its.]

[At] the beginning of this year VFW [m]erged with MBB, leaving the tax[payer] to foot a bill of nearly DM1bn for [the e]xperiment.

[...] Dornier's objective was more modest: a 15- to 19-seater turboprop aircraft. Why not 20 seats? Because from 20 seats on passenger aircraft are required to provide the services of an air hostess.

Claudius Dornier jr's forecast proved accurate. The two prototypes made their maiden flights in March and May respectively, strictly according to plan.

Keeping to deadlines is very much in accordance with company practice. It is something of which Dornier have rightly been proud over the years.

They are the only company left of the pre-war pioneers of Herman aviation, names such as Junkers, Heinkel, Messerschmitt, Focke and Blohm.

Junkers designed and built the Ju 52, lovingly know by pilots as *Tante Ju* (Auntie). Heinkel built the first jet aircraft ever to fly, Messerschmitt the first-ever rocket-powered aircraft.

Focke's helicopters made demonstration flights inside the Deutschlandhalle in Berlin. Blohm, a shipbuilder, saw the seaplane as the aircraft of the future.


All of them, or what was left of their companies after the Second World War, now form part of Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm.

Claude Dornier, the father of the current owner, was a Swabian of French descent who also set great store by the seaplane, first working for Count Zeppelin in the autumn of 1914.

He began by designing an all-metal flying boat at the Zeppelin works on the shores of Lake Constance. A year later the prototype was built but destroyed in a storm just before it was due to make its maiden flight.

Six months later the first Dornier flying boat took off from Lake Constance, which was to continue as his home base even though he moved to Pisa, Italy, at one stage.

That was after the First World War



when all he was allowed to manufacture at Seemoos on Lake Constance was buckets and washtubs.

In 1922 he set up in business on his own and manufactured flying boats on both the German and the Swiss shores of the lake.


Dornier was convinced the future of aviation was on the water. His pre-war jumbos (dubbed "whales") made him famous, both by flying round the world and in daily use as passenger and air mail aircraft.

On 5 November 1930 Claude Dornier and his wife boarded an airship moored in the Zuiderzee. It was the Do X, weighing 50 tons and capable of carrying up to 170 passengers with its 12 engines.

Captain Christiansen flew it like a ship from the bridge, and the 70 passengers enjoyed the comfort and luxury of travel by ocean liner.

The Do X crossed the South Atlantic to Rio de Janeiro, flew north to New York and finally landed on the Müggelsee in Berlin.

But that was the end of the story. The Depression put paid to the expansion of civil aviation and the Do X was put out to graze in a Berlin museum and later destroyed in a World War II air raid.


The Do 228 . . . no pretensions. (Photo: Dornier)

Like all German aircraft manufacturers Dornier produced aircraft for the Luftwaffe, conventional aircraft, and when the manufacture of aircraft was banned in Germany after the Second World War he no longer manufactured buckets instead.

Dornier diversified into textile machinery and still manufactures machinery for the textile industry.

But the 1979 company report states: "A definite improvement in the order position made it necessary for the company to step up production."

Three out of four aircraft currently manufactured in Lindau on Lake Constance are exported.

Meanwhile, back in the early 50s, Claude Dornier was an aircraft designer by inclination who was obliged by Allied restrictions to manufacture textile machinery instead.

In Spain he set up a base to manufacture the single-engined short take-off Do 27, of which more than 600 were sold. Its successor, the Do 28, a twin-engined model, was the first post-war German aircraft to sell to the United States.

Then came the Skyservant, designed to compete in the utility commuter market, a sector in which Dornier hope to improve their position with the new Do 228.

Internationally orientated, aero engineers no longer bother to translate concepts such as "utility" or "commuter" into German.

The combination of the two means multi-purpose working aircraft that can also be used to ferry commuters to international airports.

The latest company report reveals that turnover is little short of DM1bn and a payroll of over 8,000 work in a group of companies active in many sectors.

Dornier does not just mean civil and military aircraft, including the lightweight Alpha Jet fighter built in collaboration with France.

There is also a satellite and rocket systems division. New technology and electronics form part of the range, just as do medical technology and transport engineering.

Dornier are even engaged in subterranean activities with a system analysis of partially-automated mining. And when the smog alarm is sounded in the Ruhr, Dornier measuring devices carry out many of the environmental checks.

Stay independent and steer clear of incalculable risks, Professor Dornier always said (both Claude and Claudius enjoy the professorial distinction).

That was why Dornier withstood initial pressure and temptation from Bonn to merge with others. Originally associated with the Airbus project, Dornier later decided to quit.

To this day they supply components and work as sub-contractors for the Airbus, thereby profiting from the project's success, but Dornier have nothing to do with the risk factor.

"I have always taken good care to carry on regardless with the design principles I endorse, even at the risk of being considered behind the times," Claude Dornier once wrote.

He died in 1969 but this comment might well have been written with the Do 228 in mind, although Dornier can count themselves lucky in this context to have been commissioned by the Bonn Research Ministry to design a new wing concept.

This contract, which is known by its German initials TNT, resulted in a wing design which, combined with other technical refinements, cut the Do 228's fuel consumption by up to 25 per cent.

As with all Bonn research contracts, the findings are placed at the disposal of any German manufacturer interested in benefiting from them.

But Dornier enjoyed the advantage of being able to combine the new design with the old Skyservant and develop the new Do 228 at a cost of DM40m.

The 200-seater A 310 Airbus, for instance, will have cost roughly DM1bn to research and develop, or roughly 25 times more.

Dornier were also given the usual facility of a government grant repayable under certain circumstances. The management prefer not to say how much it was.

As a rule it amounts to at least 60 per cent of project development costs, and it is repayable in part with every aircraft sold.

Dornier were given a similar grant for the Skyservant, the Do 228's predecessor. The management are now proud to be able to say that every pfennig of the DM5.2m loan has been repaid.

Twenty-three Skyservants were sold from the drawing-board, as it were, at a unit cost of roughly DM3m. Options have been placed for a further 52.

Yet Bonn provides neither sales nor marketing assistance, let alone low-interest loan facilities for purchasers of German-made aircraft.

Conveniently for Dornier, the manufacturing techniques and machine tools for the Alpha Jet's wing units can be used to manufacture the wing units for the Do 228.

So no additional investment is needed for the proposed monthly output of three 228s. It fits neatly into the Dornier range, as deputy board chairman Bernhard Schmidt says.

He and fellow-deputy Karl-Wilhelm Schäfer are in line to take over from Claudius Dornier jr when he retires.

The Do 228 certainly ensures jobs for the men and women on Dornier's payroll. As no further Luftwaffe orders are in the pipeline redundancies would have been inevitable had not the Do 228 been in the offing.

Heinz Michaels

(Die Zeit, 5 June 1981)

NUCLEAR ENERGY

When atom warhead hits atom power station . . .



A third of the surface area of the Federal Republic of Germany would be uninhabitable for more than a month if an atomic warhead scored a direct hit on a German nuclear power station, says a report by research scientists.

And a slightly smaller area would still be contaminated a year later.

The scientists, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, have taken as their hypothesis the Kornwestheim power station, between Stuttgart and Heilbronn.

Included in the national third of the country affected would be the conurbations of Rhine-Main, Cologne-Bonn and Rhine-Ruhr.

The report is by Steven Fetter and Kosta Tsipis, who work at MIT's physics department on an international security programme.

They have described the results in an article in the *Scientific American*.

Tsipis is considered an expert on nuclear arms limitation and the assessment of new weapons systems. Fetter is one of his students.

They work on the assumption that a warhead with the explosive force of a megaton of TNT scores a direct hit on a nuclear power station with an installed capacity of 1,000 megawatts.

The explosion, they reckon, would make the entire reactor core evaporate and release its entire radioactive potential.

The atomic mushroom created by the explosion of the warhead would carry all the reactor's fissile material to an altitude of nearly 20km, from there to blow in the wind.

The two scientists then simulated the course of the contaminated cloud and the surface area on which radioactive fallout could be expected to descend.

They finally compared this radiation with the effect of a warhead that did not hit a nuclear power station.

The main difference between the two cases is the kind of radioactive material released:

• Were a thermonuclear warhead to explode without hitting a nuclear power station the fallout would consist mainly of short-life radioactive material.

Initially it would be powerfully radioactive but the degree of contamination would tail off so rapidly that large areas of the contaminated region would no longer be absolutely out of bounds before long.

After a few days or weeks man could set foot in them again.

• This would not be the case if a warhead were to score a direct hit on a nuclear power station. Long-life radioactive material such as uranium, plutonium and thorium would then be released.

It would be carried from the reactor into the environment, and its radioactivity would be much slower to subside in intensity.

Fetter and Tsipis assume, for the purposes of argument, that a Force 4 south-easterly wind is blowing the day the missile knocks out Kornwestheim.

Stuttgart meteorologists say this would be most unlikely. The wind only blows from the south-east in the Neckar valley on 18 days a year.

But if it just happened to be one of these days the consequences would indeed be catastrophic.

The area in which radiation would be so powerful as to end all life immediately would cover about 1,300 square kilometres, an area about half the size of the Saar.

If the explosion were not to hit a nuclear power station the area so contaminated would be smaller by a third.

Over an area of 5,000 square kilometres, or roughly the equivalent of the surface area of West Berlin, human life would be ruled out for a full century.

This long-term contamination would be due to radioactive material released from the nuclear reactor.

The two scientists comment, almost cynically: "The evaporation of a reactor core by means of nuclear weapons is, of course, an effective way of devastating large areas of a country."

With a single thermonuclear warhead a potential aggressor could knock out a substantial proportion of enemy industrial capacity.

All he would need to do would be to wait until the weather is right, the wind is blowing in the right direction, to ensure maximum effect.

If a south-easterly wind were to blow in the Neckar valley, Fetter and Tsipis say, a nuclear attack on Kornwestheim could make a third of the Federal Republic uninhabitable for more than a month.

According to their calculations the area so hit would resemble a king-sized cigar running the length of Germany on the map.

A year later an area extending from Stuttgart via Wiesbaden and Cologne to Amsterdam would still be contaminated to the extent of 10 standard units of radioactivity per annum. Staff at nuclear research facilities and reactors are currently allowed to be exposed to no more than five units a year. The level of natural radioactivity to which people in the Federal Republic are exposed amounts to 0.1 units per annum. Exposure to 10 units a year is a level at which doctors feel they can no longer rule out the possibility of long-term harmful effects. The initial cigar would encompass millions of people in Frankfurt, Cologne and the Ruhr. To begin with, radiation would be much higher than the equivalent of 10 units a year. So it would appear virtually out of the question to evacuate the entire population in time. Similar surveys conducted in Germany also consider the repercussions of a mishap and outline catastrophe plans, but they fail to take into account the possibility of histilities.

No express mention of war is made in the reports compiled in Germany, and the MIT findings were news to both the Bonn Interior Ministry and the Reactor Safety Association.

"Scenarios such as these have yet to be considered in this country," said a spokesman for the Association.

The MIT survey, like any estimate, has its drawbacks. It is hard to describe the reality. Neckarwestheim, a pressurised-water reactor, does not generate 1,000 megawatts either, only 805 megawatts.

In that part of Germany the wind mostly blows from the west and south-west, and neither are directions in which a potential aggressor, always assuming the East Bloc is meant, could have the slightest interest.

If the wind were blowing from the west or south-west, a nuclear strike against a power station in West Germany would almost certainly contaminate parts of the GDR or Czechoslovakia.

Besides, the wind speed assumed in the study does not make sense. Every student of meteorology soon learns that wind speed and direction at ground level need not be the same as at an altitude of several kilometres, let alone 10 or so.

Yet Fetter and Tsipis assume a constant wind speed and direction at all altitudes. Even if they were mistaken on this point, however, the lethal contamination zone would merely be somewhere else. Criticism is bound to be levelled at the weather conditions assumed. Critics are also sure to consider whether such an attack is at all probable.

Even so, the article is sure to prompt serious debate in the context of the missile modernisation decision.

There have, of course, been even more pessimistic assumptions, such as that in the event of a nuclear holocaust there would be nothing left of Germany, regardless whether or not nuclear power stations were hit.

Horst Rademacher

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 3 June 1981)

The danger zone, presuming a south-easterly wind. The area darkly shaded would be contaminated for a year after the blast. The lightly shaded area would be affected for a month.

Waste storage setback

Doubt has been cast over the suitability of a site intended for the permanent storage of radioactive waste.

The site, near Gorleben, in Lower Saxony, contains salt deposits more than 200 million years old.

But drilling tests now indicate that there may not be enough salt to provide a permanent home for the more lethal types of nuclear waste.

They might, of course, still be suitable for storage of waste with medium or low radioactivity, but a final decision will not be taken until the end of the decade.

The search for sites where spent nuclear fuel might be processed seems much more promising.

Last year Hesse Premier Holger Börner said his government was prepared to give the go-ahead for nuclear fuel processing somewhere in Hesse.

A special conference of the Hesse SPD is to be held this month and it might decide against this option, but that still leaves alternative locations in Lower Saxony, Bavaria and the Rhineland-Palatinate.

Günther Scheuten, board chairman of the Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Agency, recently held talks with Rhineland-Palatinate Agriculture Minister Heinrich Holkenbrink on the subject.

Herr Holkenbrink's government initially plans to give permission only for a 350-tonne installation, similar to the one planned in Hesse.

But the agency would like to choose a site suitable for a larger capacity, and Bavaria, a state with a large surface area, is an *obvious choice in this connection.*

After lengthy resistance the Bavarian authorities in Munich have declared themselves ready to deal with specific plans for nuclear fuel recycling.

German electric power utilities have noted with satisfaction that the new French government has given assurances that current contracts on the reprocessing and intermediate storage of German nuclear fuel in France are not to be cancelled.

The contracts with Cogéma of France are due to expire in 1985 and 1986 and may not be renewed, but a further, albeit limited, facility might be used in Mol, Belgium.

The Belgian government has plans to reactivate a former European Community installation there, and the German agency would like to add to it a prototype unit for coating waste in molten glass.

In five years' time power utilities in Germany expect installed power reactor capacity to total roughly 19,000 megawatts, or roughly 10,000 megawatts more than at present.

Deutsche Presse-Agentur has learnt in Bonn that the first German processing facility for spent nuclear fuel is to be built near Volkmarsen in Hesse.

The agency responsible, with headquarters in Hanover, refused point blank to comment on the matter, but it is expected to name its first site before the SPD party conference is held in Hesse.

It may propose a number of sites. The installation will certainly cost substantially more than the DM4bn or so originally estimated.

It would, in the long term, provide employment for 1,600 people, plus as many again indirectly, not including construction workers.

Heinz-Peter Finke

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 6 June 1981)

■ THE ARTS

Borchert and 'outcry of a generation'

Draussen vor der Tür was written in a week by Wolfgang Borchert, a 25-year-old at death's door, in December 1946.

It was premiered as a radio play a month later on 13 January 1947, prompting a listener response that could only be called an avalanche.

Listeners wrote in and phoned, making Borchert, who would have been 60 this month, a household name. His play was immediately hailed as the outcry of an entire generation, a generation betrayed.

On 21 November 1947 it was premiered on the stage in his native Hamburg, then staged everywhere. It has since been translated into 32 languages.

As the curtain fell Beckmann, the male lead, asked: "Will no-one, no-one answer?" It was an anguished question posed by many at the time, after the defeat of Germany and the hardship of the immediate post-war period.

Beckmann is a soldier returned from the war. Borchert did not live to return and maybe answer the question. He died of a liver complaint in Basle the day before the premiere.

Why was is that he emerged as the mouthpiece of an entire generation? Borchert, in his short stories and his play, dealt first and most convincingly with issues relating to the demobbed Wehrmacht soldier, the returnees, the hungry and the despairing.

Draussen vor der Tür in particular was a work in which homeless youngsters back from the was, a "generation that never took its leave," as they have been called, recognised individuals and events relevant to themselves.



Wolfgang Borchert

(Photo: Rosemarie Clausen)

Also, he died young, as befitted a legend. He became decidedly fashionable with his tales taken and adapted for the most part from his own experiences and retold with a note of self-pity.

His public was certainly able to cast itself in the role of the suffering and disadvantaged. Initially his tales must have had a therapeutic effect.

He was born on 20 May 1921 in Hamburg. His father was a primary school teacher, his mother a successful local writer who was later to help popularise his work.

He wanted from an early age to be a poet, but his early work lacked originality, or so his sympathetic biographer, Hamburg poet Peter Rühmkorf, reckons.

At 18 he began an apprenticeship as a bookseller, surreptitiously taking drama lessons in his spare time. He also wrote poems and began to be taken notice of by the Gestapo.

He was given his first stage contract on 1941 but called up for military service on the Eastern front three months later.

He began to suffer from jaundice and was suspected of mutilating himself to evade military service, being promptly arrested, sentenced and sent back to the front on parole, as it were.

After a short home leave during which he worked as a cabaret artist he was denounced, arrested, sentenced and sent back to the front again.

In spring 1945 he was taken prisoner by the French but escaped and returned to Hamburg on foot, already a dying man.

He worked as an assistant director at the Schauspielhaus and wrote his first short story, *Die Hundeblume*, in hospital. It and three others were his first book to be published.

He then embarked on a race with death, penning 24 prose pieces and his play by the end of 1946.

Between January and September 1947 he wrote another 22 stories, travelling to Basle on 22 September. There he completed on the eve of his death an anti-war manifesto in which he implacable and unconditionally opposed both war-mongers and those who made light of war.

(Nürnberger Nachrichten, 18 May 1981)

Werner Egk

(Photo

Banned ballet gave Egk his big break

Composer Werner Egk, 80, did really make a name for himself 1948 when his ballet *Abraxas* was ned by Bavarian Arts Minister Hundhammer.

Egk, whose conventional music ed on the point of being condemned oblivion as atonal and twelve-tone swept the board, was suddenly topic

The entire musical world sided him in view of the prude absurdity Bavarian censorship.

He had previously been penalised the Nazis, with whom he had rated cautiously, preventing the and promoting what was sensible.

In his 1938 opera *Peer Gynt* he racterised the trolls in grotesque unharmonious tones, much to the grin of the Nazis, who promptly that he was generally destructive in look.

He was well advised to cease composing until 1945.

Egk, a pupil of Carl Orff's, was near Augsburg in 1901. He inher Orff's elementary feeling for the and his literary accomplishments since he wrote most of his own libre

There has not been much discus of Egk since the war but against background of peace and quiet he emerged as the most successful German opera composer.

His *Government Inspector*, written 1947 and based on the Gogol could well outlive the 20th century view of its concentrated action uninterruptedly compelling music.

His *Engagement in San Do* 1963, has remained alive by virtue of lofty ethical ambitions, while his opera, a version of Pocci's *The Violin*, is truly fairytale in quality.

A number of his ballets and orchestral and chamber music are larly included in musical repertoire

Werner Egk has shown it is still ible to make good music without part in the hue and cry of comp to keep up with seeming progress.


Substance, his career demonstr can also be attained by prudently unassumingly relying on one's own periences and convictions.

It is one of the bad jokes of history that such a reserved and vative musician in the best sense word happened to hit the headlines the way he did in 1948.

Alfons Neuk

(Rheinische Post, 16 May

Ernst Jünger's *Siebzig verweht*, published by Klett-Cotta of Stuttgart in hard back at DM45, is a diary covering the period from 30 March 1965 to 12 December 1970.



Travelling with, and listening to, Ernst Jünger

Nowhere is mention made of the criteria by which entries were selected for publication, but it seems reasonable to assume that the emphasis was on including travel notes.

They cover Jünger's travels in the Far East, to Angola, Portugal, Iceland, the Canaries and a lengthier spell at Villa Massimo in Rome.

The first entry is most characteristic of the older Jünger: "I have reached the Biblical age of three score and ten. (He is now 86). How strange for someone who in his youth never expected to reach the age of thirty!

"In one's youth the basic tenor is frequently somewhat gloomy, as though autumn were already casting its shadow in advance.

"The world is foggy, with dark blocks emerging from the gloom. Gradually the view grows clearer. Even living has to be learned."

Jünger's thought patterns run along lines that we, for lack of a more precise concept, tend to call conservative. This epithet is equally appropriate to his latest work.

It is striking that his diary hardly registers, let alone comments politically, political events. Whatever interpretation is given to this abstinence, it is certainly no coincidence.

Take, for instance, a May 1965 entry to the effect that a powerful political effect is unfavourable for both the work and the artist.

Anyone who wanted to achieve success nowadays, he wrote, had to abide by planetary commonplaces.

So it comes as no surprise to learn that his notes on Angola, which he visited in 1966, do not confirm to the approved stereotypes of contemporary anti-colonialism.

Jünger is concerned with the typical, so the aspect of the world that is relayed to us by the news media is seen as less important, although this does not, let it be added, prevent him from showing the flag.

"If the negroes were to follow their *nomos*," he notes at one particulary salient point in the book, "it would look different and more natural here.

"Terms such as 'equal rights' are adapted yet used only with a view to the use of force. The world has entered into a phase in which one person taps the uneasy conscience of the other.

"Milking the conscience is a new profession that provides nations, parties and even individual philosophers with a livelihood.

"That doesn't make matters better, although it too passes. As far as I am concerned, I have always liked negroes and still find them pleasant."

His notes on Angola and Ceylon are,

Ernst Jünger

(Photo: dpa)

in both form and content, among the most impressive in the book. It is worth adding that the purely descriptive passages in particular at times include impressions of great beauty and detail.

Siebzig verweht and Jünger's unpublished diaries must be virtually without parallel in contemporary German literature.

Franz Schonauer

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 22 May 1981)

■ MEDICINE

Uphill struggle in research into chromosome disorders

Five babies in every thousand are born with chromosome disorders.

Among the causes are hereditary factors, drugs taken during pregnancy and alcoholism.

Children affected suffer all their lives and may pass their disorder on to their children.

The hereditary element has been increasing, say experts, because of chemical pollution on the environment and its effect on the genes.

There are some 2,300 known hereditary disorders which inevitably affect the metabolism. Realising this, researchers have made an all-out effort to fathom the interplay between genetic disorders and their biochemical causes.

Results have been meagre however. Biochemical explanations have been found for less than 10 per cent of the known genetic disorders.

Symptoms vary widely, depending on the type of defect. Apart from considerable organic disorders, neurological problems play a major part in these hereditary defects. Cretinism and similar symptoms are frequently the outward manifestations of biochemical defects.

The first genetic disorder clearly attributable to biochemical causes is alkaptonuria. This is a rare recessive metabolic anomaly marked by the inability to complete the degradation of homogentisic acid.

Homogentisic acid is an intermediate *in the metabolism of phenylalanine* and tyrosine.

In the normal organism, this is processed by a liver enzyme. But alkaptonuria sufferers either lack this enzyme or it refuses to do its job. Yet outwardly these people appear perfectly healthy and it is not until fairly late that they develop a type of arthritis.

Due to its causes, alkaptonuria is classed as a hereditary disease in which the amino acid metabolism is defective.

Another disease in this category is phenylketonuria.

This occurs in one out of 10,000 new born babies and is caused by a marked inability to oxydise phenylpyruvic acid and is characterised by severe mental deficiency.

But screening processes of newborn babies now make it possible to diagnose and treat at an early stage.

It is important that affected infants be given a diet that contains no phenylalanine. This means a vegetarian diet until the age of 10. But results are usually good and mental deficiency can be prevented or mitigated.


There are a number of other genetic anomalies due to disorders of the amino acid metabolism that partly respond to dietary treatment. They fall in the category of storage diseases and include such anomalies as sphingolipidism.

Sphingolipids are a group of lipids that yield sphinogosine or any-one of its derivatives. Enzyme defects in sphingolipidism sufferers prevent the degradation of sphingolipids. As a result, sphigolipids are stored in the nerve tissues where they cause severe neurological disorders.

These enzyme defects are hereditary, meaning that a sufferer is likely to pass the anomaly on to her child.

The treatment of this and other storage anomalies is still difficult.

Attempts to offset the enzyme shor-



tage by diet seemed successful in the beginning. But the enzyme fed to the *sufferer soon becomes inactive, requiring* ever higher dosages.

In the end, the body reacts by immunisation and the drugs administered become ineffectual.

Kidney transplantations have been fairly successful (usually involving the transplantation of one healthy kidney) because the good kidney provides the body with the missing enzymes.

Another important storage anomaly is mucopolysaccharidosis which is characterised by abnormal production, storage and excretion of one or more mucopolysaccharides, the complex carbohydrates that are the chief constituents of the substance filling the spaces between *the cells and fibres of the connective* tissues.

Skeletal deformities — including dwarfism and a grotesque facial appearance — mental deficiency, heart defects, enlargement of the liver and the spleen, opacity of the corneas and deafness are frequent symptoms.

Haemophilia has long been regarded as one of the most important genetic anomalies. Only male members of the family get it, although the mother passes *on the predisposition.*

The frequency of haemophilia is about one in 10,000. Therapeutic prospects are good today due to modern coagulants.

While haemophilia is due to the blood's inability to coagulate, other hereditary anomalies also involving the blood are based on haemoglobin disorders.

One of these anomalies is sickle-cell anaemia. This is primarily found among negros. *The name is derived from the* shape of the red blood corpuscles that undergo a pathological change.

The illness was first identified in 1910 but it was not until very much later that it was pinpointed as a hereditary anomaly.

Sickle-cell anaemia is characterised by malformation of the blood corpuscles after they have yielded oxygen, when they form erythrocytes, blood cells containing hemoglobin and subserving the internal transport of oxygen.

Sickle-cell anaemia cannot be treated, due to inadequate knowledge of the mechanisms governing biomolecules.

Hereditary metabolism defects can have a wide variety of consequences. Thus, for instance, the various blood types (A, B and O) are simply enzyme defects.

Other disorders lead to illness only if environmental conditions are particularly unfavourable.

But where hereditary metabolism disorders in the true sense are concerned, the illness occurs independent of environment factors.

As unclear as most molecular mechanisms in hereditary disorders are the causes of genetic defects.

Since spontaneous changes in the genetic material occur all the tim[e] could serve as an explanation for [heredi]tary anomolies. But there can b[e] doubt that environment factors [play a] major role. This is in keeping wi[th] insights into the effects of radia[tion and] chemicals on the genetic material.

It is no secret that a large num[ber of] chemicals found in the environme[nt are] suspected of having a harmful ef[fect on] the genetic material. But few c[onclu]sions have been drawn from this [informa]tion so far.

It is unlikely that we shall su[cceed in] the foreseeable future in analys[ing sus]pect substances and their effects [on the] genetic material.

The number of these subs[tances is] growing much faster than are t[he efforts] to pinpoint (or disprove) their [harmful]ness.

Thus the only course of actio[n open] to us today is genetic counsellin[g. The] prospects here are excellent [thanks to] good prenatal diagnostic po[ssibilities] when many defects can be p[inpointed] during pregnancy.

This requires, however, that [we en]large our chromosome laboratori[es so that] such analyses can be carried out.

Where severe genetic anomal[ies are] concerned, our abortion legislatio[n pro]vides ample legal instruments to [allow] a pregnant woman to have the [foetus] removed.

Surprisingly, however, abortion p[lays a] minor role in genetic counselling [...] women want to have a child [...] cases where a doctor has advised [abor]tion.

Future medical research will [...] concentrate more on the molecul[ar me]chanics in connection with [...] anomalies due to enzyme defects.

This would improve prenatal d[iagnos]tic methods still further and help [deve]lop new therapy concepts.

Wolf G. Dome[...]

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, [...])

Diagnosis, treatment of deaf children in firing line

Diagnosis and care of deaf and partly deaf children has come under heavy criticism.

Doctors, teachers and politicians all are blamed by the National Federation of Parents and Friends of Children who are Hard of Hearing, for a situation it calls "disastrous".

It says in a memorandum that hearing defects are diagnosed too late; that diagnosis depends to a large extent on coincidence; and that shortcomings in care for the deaf and their treatment have not been improved.

Doctors still underestimate that importance of hearing and development defects, says the federation.

They minimise parents' concern when a child is late in starting to talk.

"Many doctors shrug their shoulders and say that Einstein was four before he started talking," says the memorandum.

The consequences of deafness and near deafness could be alleviated if diagnosis *were made in the first year of* life and all possibilities of influencing the still undeveloped brain were made use of.

It appears that the number of children born deaf is much smaller than assumed. As a result, hearing defects must be prevented by early treatment — es-



pecially in view of the fact that preventive measures are taken for granted in connection with other disabilities.

The memorandum points to the fact that little has been done in the past few years to remedy the existing shortcomings.

A 1980 survey showed essentially the same results as a similar survey made in 1976: hearing tests in the course of preventive checkups as practised today are totally inadequate.

Only five per cent of hearing defects are diagnosed in the course of these checkups. And doctors are still far from making it a matter of routine to check the hearing ability of risk children.

As a result, many hearing defects are *diagnosed too late — on average at the* age of two years and three months.

Even here, much depends on coincidence rather than on a systematic test.

This is primarily due to the attitude of general practitioners, pediatricians and ear, nose and throat specialists who still underestimate the importance of hearing and development defects and who [min]imise the parents' concern when [they] tell the doctor that a child is la[te in] starting to talk.

Medical care for these children is [...] or non-existent.

Apart from a few exceptions [...] doctors know little about speec[h and] hearing defects in children.

The situation is also characteris[ed by] the fact that it takes 12 months [from] the first suspicion that there is [some]thing wrong with a child's hear[ing to] the final medical confirmation.

It then takes another nine mont[hs be]fore a child is fitted with a hearin[g aid].

By that time the average child [is ...] years old. Moreover, most hear[ing aids] are prescribed without a thorough [medi]cal examination.


And, finally, the educational tr[eatment] of children who are hard of hear[ing is] largely inadequate. This is done [prac]tically only at the University [clinics] of Mainz and Münster.

The early educcation of child[ren with] hearing defects (if it takes pla[ce] neglects even the most basic [...] for an optimal speech training.

There are, for instance, some [special]ised teachers who make lip rea[ding im]possible because their faces are [hidden] by beards.

In view of this, it would see[m that] the only course of action is to [embark] on an information campaign [...] the parents of small children [to look out] for signs of hearing defects.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine [Zeitung] für Deutschland, 3 J[une 1981])



■ THE MEDIA

Radio, television crime programmes 'not analytical enough'

Radio and television crime programmes have been simplified to cater for public taste, says a Münster criminologist.

The criminal is rarely depicted within his environment and, as a result, crime is shown not as it is but as people want to see it, Hans Joachim Schneider told a symposium in Cologne.

He said radio and television "have to make everything understandable."

What they should do instead was look closer at crime and give more analysis and arguments.. "and less in the way of fairy tales."

The symposium, held by Cologne University's department of broadcasting law, was generally heavy going.

But it was enlightened by one piece of levity when Ingeborg Donnepp, Justice Minister for North Rhine-Westphalia reported on a children's essay and painting competition.

Entries for this "Ideas on our system of Justice" competition in many cases drew inspiration from American whodunnits rather than German courtrooms.

There was also confusion over German and British court rooms: children asked time and time again what had happened to the wigs of German judges.

Dietrich Oehler, an expert on broadcasting law, told the audience of a personal experience during a bus ride through New York when he helped out another passenger with some small change while the rest of the passengers either sat mum or looked aghast.

It appeared that there was a widespread fear in New York of people asking for small change as a clever trick in holdups — a fear nurtured by media reports on such methods.

The distribution of roles in Cologne was unequivocal: politics was assigned the function of prosecutor; science that of the sleuth in search of evidence and the broadcasting corporations were placed in the dock.

The main carge: radio and television convey a wrong picture of crime and the judiciary system in this country.

Frau Donnepp zeroed in on the manner of reporting by television. This, she said, was governed by sterotypes that seized upon the same images and characteristics time and again because television after all depends on pictures.


By doing so, our TV, she said, failed to convey the whole range of judiciary reality which extends from the phase of police investigation all the way to the correctional institution, including ultimate rehabilitation.

Television showed a more or less criminal society against which the police is powerless.

Thus, for instance, one in four cases dealt with in the series "XY-Unsolved" (a series depicting true crimes that have remained unsolved and calling on the public to assist the police) involves murder although homicide accounts for only 0.09 per cent of the crimes committed in North Rhine-Westphalia.

Donnepp also attacked the manner in which TV stations report on the rehabilitation of criminals.

In North Rhine-Westphalia, some 40,000 prisoners were given furlough in 1980, she said. And one out of five prisoners served his sentence in an open institution.



Radio and television, on the other hand, exaggerate the abuse of this type of correctional institution at the expense of objective reporting on the total field of *rehabilitation*. "Abuse is the exception rather than the rule," said Frau Donnepp.

She was concerned over the link between the manner in which violence is presented on television and the statistical increase of aggression in this country. "The media should review their approach in the light of statistics," she said.

Speaking as a scientist, Schneider said that long-term surveys of numerous types of programmes ranging from news broadcasts to whodunnits showed that there was a trend to distort the phenomena that go with crimes of violence.

Radio and television, he said, usually omitted to look at things from a close-up perspective, the only one that helps promote understanding.

The criminal was rarely depicted within his environment. As a result, crime was not shown as it is but as the people want to see it.

Irrational reactions were thus promoted. The public could project all those things on to the happenings on the screen that it found intolerable for itself.

Why these patterns of simplification in the whodunnit? Says Schneider: "The programme makers orientate themselves by the public's need for simplification. Everything must be understandable. This would change with a close-up perspective that would provide more analysis and arguments and less in the way of fairy tales."

His conclusions were thought provoking. There can be no doubt that certain inexplicable attitudes such as the crowds that gather on the scene of road accidents or the mass hysteria after spectacular attacks on high ranking personalities could be explained.

But the TV viewers are overtaxed because of their diminishing ability to distinguish between fantasy and reality.

First they are confronted with a real killing in the news service and then with a fictional murder in a crime movie. This leads to a constant confusion of elements of information and entertainment.

As a result, crime is not digested — neither psychologically nor socially — thus preventing any true insight into the problems involved.

Overemphasis of formalised social control (police and courts) is the consequence.

In summing up, Herr Schneider said that broadcasting contributes in promoting a climate of violence in our society whenever it fails to strengthen informal social control.

In view of the overwhelming evidence amassed by the "prosecution" in Cologne, the "accused" had no choice but to resort to a massive defence.

To this end, the organisers seized upon the director-general of the Saarland Broadcasting System, Hubert Rohde.

But he seems to have misunderstood his role. Instead of correcting his accusers, he surprised the forum by praising the achievements and performance of our broadcasting corporations.

As if his function were to satisfy the wishes of a group of visitors to his [station], Herr Rohde quoted several [ex]amples of programmes provided by [his] own station to demonstrate how [...] and objective they are. He used tun[e-in] quotas as criteria of the journa[lists'] handling of crimes in his own [pro]grammes.

But the examples cited by him [sat]isfied neither the criminologists n[or the] expectations of the general public.

The public, incidentally, had [...] been fatigued by Rohde's presentation [of] data on his station's handling of [the] squatter phenomenon.

The paper read by the Canadi[an cri]minologist Kos-Rabcewicz-Zub[kowski] on the commercial media in the [United] States and Canada shed a differ[ent light] on the issues at stake.

Violence on television, he said, [is a] major issue in Canada. He poin[ted to] the growing sensitivity to the li[nk be]tween television and aggression.

To provide orientation outside [the] "sex and crime" programmes pre[sented] on television constantly, America[n sta]tions now provide films on reha[bilita]tion, psychological understanding [of] criminals and similar subjects as [...] video libraries — in other words, [...] TV programmes.

The possible commercialisatio[n of] broadcasting in Germany added t[o the] explosiveness of the Cologne discus[sion].

Since our broadcasting system i[s go]verned by tune-in quotas ac[...] depends on the "marketing of h[uman] frailities", all attempts at commerc[ialisa]tion must be warded off, said Frau [Don]nepp.

Schneider, on the other hand, s[aw lit]tle difference between private and c[om]mercial broadcasting systems.

But his views are likely to be co[ntro]versial, says broadcasting expert W[olf]gang Hoffmann-Riehm in his stu[dy of] commercial television in the US[...]

According to him, "nothing sells fo[r] better tune-in quotas than a thrill[ing] depiction of violence."

Ralf Siepman[n]

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 29 May 1[981])

Politically not so relevant

The media are losing their importance as political informants, says a poll commissioned by the various broadcasting corporations.

It found that the generation under 30 (those questioned ranged from 14 to 29) finds that newspapers, television and radio do not have politically relevant information.

Daily newspapers are less objective than radio and television, say respondents.

Only 11 per cent of people under 30 said the dailies were objective compared to 30 per cent for radio and television.

Despite this, daily newspapers are more popular than television in the 20-29 age group.

Radio is most popular among those aged between 14 and 19.

The survey examined the change in attitudes towards the mass media from 1964 to 1980.

The most conspicuous finding is that the young of 1980 was reached by the media much less than in 1974.

The decline among those under 20 was 6 per cent for TV (which reaches only 66 per cent of that age group), 11 per cent for radio (which reaches 19 per cent) and 17 per cent for dailies (which reach 53 per cent).

While newspapers and radio show improved results in the next age group (from 20 to 29) where 72 per cent are reached by dailies and 81 per cent by radio), television's losses are massive in this age group where they amount to 7 per cent compared with only 2 per cent for the 30 to 39-year-olds.

While politicians still talk of a "youth addicted to television" these young people have changed their leisure time attitudes and along with them their political self-appraisal.

Thirty four per cent of 15 to 19-year-olds said they were politically interested (up 13 per cent against 1974) and 53 per cent of the 20 to 29-year-olds expressed the same interest (up 15 per cent).

The analysis concludes that there is not necessarily a contraction in the growing interest of young people in politics and their diminished interest in television "because political participation possibilities outside established organisations and parties play the more important role."

The conclusion closes with the terse statement: "It is evident that the established media are losing their importance as conveyors of political information."

Moreover, the generation under 30 finds that neither the press nor radio nor television conveys the inform[ation] they consider politically relevant.

Asked if they would term the m[anner] of reporting in the media "objec[tive]", both those between 14 and those [be]tween 20 and 29 shook their h[eads]. Only 11 per cent consider the d[ailies] objective and just under 30 per cent [say] the same of radio and television.

If these young people had to ch[oose] between media, the younger ones w[ould] miss television slightly more tha[n] other media (32 per cent). What [they] would really miss would be radio [...] per cent).

But among those between 20 a[nd 29] the dailies rate tops: 62 per cent w[ould] miss them greatly. The same [...] applies to radio while TV wou[ld be] missed by only 31 per cent in th[is age] group (ten years ago this figure st[ood at] 53 per cent).

Even though the media have [not] passed the objectivity test of the y[oung] people, the link here is neverthles[s ...] litical information: 53 per cent of [20] to 29-year-olds and 31 per cent of [...] 14 to 19-year-olds consider politi[cal in]formation on TV indispensable.

Only the younger ones have a g[...] interest in entertainment. This [dimi]nishes after the age of 20. So far [as the] population as a whole is concerned, [...] 23 per cent of the public conside[r enter]tainment of major importance.

Rolf Dön[...]

(Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 Ma[y 1981])

[SP]ORT

Hanika baulks as French Open victory beckons

[Aft]er taking leads of 2-0 and 4-0 in [th]e final of the French Open in [...] Munich tennis ace Sylvia Hanika, [sn]atched defeat from the jaws of vic[tory].

[She] went down 2-6, 4-6 to Hanna [Mandli]kova, 19, of Czechoslovakia, but it [wa]s the Czech girl than her own [...] that proved her undoing.

[...] Mandlikova was afraid of her but [...] to win. If only Miss Hanika had [...] more of the imperturbability with [...] Björn Borg handles tricky situa[tions] she could easily have been the [...]

[Borg] won the men's singles by beat[ing Iva]n Lendl in the final.

[Miss] Hanika the daughter of a Mu[nich] building contractor, was unnerved [by the] prospect of victory.

[She] began in the style in which she [had] eliminated Martina Navratilova and [...] Jäger, led 2-0 in the first set and [was t]aken aback by her own perfor[mance].

[She] had never been in a grand slam [final] but was suddenly playing like an [...]and. Miss Mandlikova, the winner [in Me]lbourne in 1980 and runner-up at [Wimble]don Meadow, was in trouble.

[Bu]t the Czech girl, daughter of for[mer] 10.2-sec. Olympic sprinter Vilem [Mand]lik, came back into the game as [sudd]enly as Miss Hanika lost her nerve [on th]e centre court.

[Miss] Mandlikova went on to win the first set 6-2, which meant winning six straight games in succession — the most humiliating defeat there is!

Even worse was to follow. Miss Hanika recovered both nerves and ball control and seemed on the point of regaining the upper hand.

Suddenly she was scoring the game points and heading for a 4-0 lead in the second set. But 5-0 eluded her. At 4-3, she failed to make it 5-3. While trailing 5-4 and serving herself, she again failed to win that next crucial game.

On at least one occasion all she needed to have done was to hold her racket in position, but somehow or other she was unable to.

A centre court crowd of 18,000 at the Stade Roland Garros realised, as did Miss Mandlikova, that it was just not to be Miss Hanika's day.

So the Czech girl was able to win with a no more than average performance. It was their ninth encounter. They were level-pegging before the final, but Miss Hanika had led 3-1 this season.

Miss Mandlikova did not show the punch she had packed in eliminating Chris Evert Lloyd, for instance, earlier in the tournament.

Miss Hanika, if only her serves and her topspin (which so worried the Czech girl) had been up to par, would have shaken Miss Mandlikova as thoroughly as she herself was shaken.

Before her first major tournament win the 19-year-old Czech girl's shortcomings were those that have frequently proved Miss Hanika's undoing. She was short on finish. But in Paris, with her parents and her manager, Betty Stove of Holland, looking on, she took her first step towards emerging as the world's top woman tennis player. "I now know I am capable of winning on any court in the world," she said. Miss Hanika's DM50,000 in prize money is scant consolation for the knowledge that she has still lacks concentration.

The Paris final brought back memories of a previous encounter in a final in Kitzbühel two years ago when the Munich girl led 6-2, 5-4 and 4-0, yet went on to lose.

She will not be capable of winning major tournaments until she thinks less about winning.

In the final of the men's singles Björn Borg of Sweden beat Ivan Lendl of Czechoslovakia 6-1, 4-6, 6-2, 3-6, 6-1 to go one step further towards becoming the most successful tennis player of all time.



Sylvia Hanika . . . slamming her way to defeat.
(Photo: Sven Simon)

It was his sixth victory in the French Open and his fourth in succession.

He turned 25 the previous day, celebrating by winning one of his toughest matches on the way to the grand slam that is his objective.

Afterwards he freely admitted: "There were only a few points between us today even though the last set was clearly in my favour."

After a mysterious shoulder injury sustained in his first-round defeat in Monte Carlo at the beginning of April by Victor Pecci, Borg was almost his old self again in Paris.

He may not have been in his very best form but he was certainly very good.

Gerhard Zimmer

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 9 June 1981)

Wind surfing hit by squall over Olympic equipment

[A wr]angle over equipment has cast [d]oubts over wind surfing's hopes of [makin]g its debut as an Olympic sport in [the 1]984 summer games in Los Angeles. [The] International Yacht Racing Union [has be]en accused of being at the route [of the] problem.

[At] the end of last year it ruled that [the s]eventh Olympic class of yacht [woul]d be the Windglider, which is [manu]factured by a German, Fred Os[terma]nn.

[The] decision was taken so that wind [surfers] throughout the world would use [standar]dised equipment.

[But] officials had reckoned without [Hoyle] Schweitzer, the American who [devise]d and patented the first Windsur[fer mo]re than 10 years ago.

[Schw]eitzer has long manufactured his [Windsu]rfer in California and feels the [IYRU']s decision in favour of the Wind[glider] deprives him of the just reward for [his inv]ention, as his Dutch patent law[yer, ...]eyng, puts it.

Schweitzer, the "father of windsur[fing]" has said: "We feel the Windsurfer [is the] only right choice, and if the deci[sion i]s not withdrawn wind surfing will [n]ot be an event at the 1984 Olym[pics]."

[He] could afford to make such a ca[tegoric]al statement because a redrafted [pa]tent had been ruled in order by an [Amer]ican court.

[Under] the new terms it is illegal not only [to s]ell an unlicensed board in the [Unite]d States but even to use one, and [Schw]eitzer clearly has no intention of [givi]ng Ostermann a licence to operate [in Am]erica.

[Sev]enteen leading wind surfers have [alrea]dy made an expert submission to [the] IYRU and the International Olympic Committee stating that in their view the German Windglider might be suited for overweight pensioners but not for top-flight athletes.

They call for a rethink on the decision to adopt the German board, claiming to feel it is evident that the officials' choice was based on criteria other than those that matter to competitors.



Board over troubled waters (Photo: Sven Simon)

At less exalted levels in wind surfing circles there is talk of the political aspects of the decision. East Bloc representatives are said to have voted against the US model to avenge the boycott of the Moscow Olympics.

Surfers and sailors have long been at loggerheads. Dago Benz, the wind surfing pioneer and chairman of the Association of German Windsurfing Schools, is forthright in his assessment of the situation.

Yacht-owners with their blue blazers and neckties have always tended to look askance at the surfing community, dismissing wind surfers as men on ironing boards.

Their path to recognition has, says Benz, been spiked with thorns, the well-heeled sailing community being most reluctant to agree.

Keen rivalry has arisen as more and more sailors take to boards. Continual crossfire in the German Yachting Association led early this year to a split.

A German Windsurfing Association as set up to represent the interests of an estimated 300,000 German wind surfers. Vice-president Dago Benz hopes that will be the end of the matter.

Surfers have visions of an entirely new method of holding regattas. The point-to-point, borrowed from yachting but considered unsatisfactory for spectators, ought, it is argued, to be replaced by new and more dynamic disciplines.

What they have in mind are events such as a wind surfing slalom, speed and trick surfing disciplines.

The rebels made no headway with IYRU representatives with such ideas, partly because new events of this kind would lead to even heavier expenditure on equipment.

Hoyle Schweitzer seems unperturbed by the possibility that arguments may prove to the detriment of wind surfing in general. If no agreement is reached advocates of wind surfing as an Olympic event will just have to wait until 1988, he says. In 1988 his patent will expire.

Sabine Reuter

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 3 June 1981)